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of the
STATE OF UTAH
PATRICIA MAUGHAN
JEPPSON,
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10452

vs.
SAYLOR JEPPSON,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This Appeal involves the question of change
of custody and visitation rights with respect to the
minor children of the divorced parties.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Plaintiff's Petition to Modify the Divorce Decree was tried to the Court. From a Judgment Modifying the Decree in accordance with Defendant's
Petition, Plaintiff appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks to have the Modification of the
Divorce Decree entered July 27, 1965, set aside,
with the exception of the provision for attorney's
1

fees and the restraining order contained in said
Decree and the Decree entered the 21st day of
August, 1964, reinstated.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties to this Appeal were divorced by
Decree entered February 21, 1962. (R. 19) Plaintiff was awarded a Decree of Divorce against Defendant on the grounds of mental cruelty. (R. 14)
The Decree of Divorce further awarded the care,
custody and control of the three minor children of
the parties, who were then ages seven, six and two,
to the Plaintiff. (R. 17, 18) Defendant remarried
June 20, 1963, and presently resides in Bountiful,
Utah. (R. 2) Plaintiff remarried June 22, 1963,
and presently resides in La Habra, California. (R.
43) All of the children resided with Plaintiff until
July, 1963, when the eldest of said children, Gary
Maughan Jeppson, then age nine, went to live with
Defendant pursuant to an agreement between the
parties. (R. 37, 38) There was a dispute between
the parties as to how long the eldest child was to
remain with Defendant. ( R. 33)
On June 26, 1964, Defendant filed a ~etition
with the District Court to Modify the Divorce Decree entered prior; Defendant asked that custody
of Gary be awarded to him and that he have 30
days visitation with the two younger children in
Utah each year. Defendant alleged a material
change of circumstances; that he had remarried
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and that Gary had lived in their home for a year
and was well adjusted and had also attained the
age of ten years. With respect to the younger children Defendant alleged he was unable to adequately
visit with them because of travel expenses and the
time factor. (R. 25, 27)
Plaintiff thereafter filed a Motion to Quash
the Order to Show Cause which had been issued in
connection with the Petition to Modify, or in the
alternative, to stay the proceedings, alleging that
Defendant had refused to return the eldest child of
the pa1·ties to her in accordance with his agreement
with her. ( R. 29, 30)
A hearing was held on Defendant's Petition
before the Honorable Charles G. Cowley on July 28,
1964, and August 4, 1964, at which time the Court
intcniewed the eldest child, Gary. ( R. 43, 44)
On August 21, 1964, the Court entered its
Findings that there had been a change of circumstances since the entry of the Divorce Decree, that
the Defendant had remarried and had established
a home where the eldest child, Gary, had lived for
a year and had been happy and had become emotionally stabilized and had a good relationship with
Defendant's new wife; that Gary had reached the
age of ten years and expressed to the Court his
desire to live with the Defendant; that Plaintiff
had refused to let Defendant visit with the other
two children of the parties except in the confines
of her own home. ( R. 37-39)
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Based on these Findings, the Court entered a
Decree on the 21st day of August, 1964, changing
the custody of the eldest child, Gary, to Defendant
except for the period July 1 to August 15 of each
year when Plaintiff would have temporary custody
in her home. The Decree further provided that Defendant be permitted to visit the two younger children in California only at such times as he wished
to make the trip; that he could take the children
from Plaintiff's home during daylight hours but
could not keep them over night. (R. 40-41)
Shortly over nine months after the entry of
Judge Cowley's Decree Defendant swore to anothe1·
Petition to "Modify Divorce and Custody Decree"
on June 3, 1965, alleging a change of circumstances
regarding the eldest child, Gary, and the other two
children of the parties,
"In that the said child absolutely refuses to
make the contemplated visit to Plaintiff as
required by said Decree and threatened to
'run away' if forced to visit with Plaintiff
in Whittier, California; he has made the Little
League baseball team and is very active in
the Cub Scout program and Defendant has
been advised by Gary's school counselor that
Gary has an emotional antagonism toward
the Plaintiff and that it would be aggravated
if Gary is required to visit the Plaintiff during the six-week period contemplated by the
Decree." (R. 48)
The same Petition also alleged a change of circumstances with regard to Defendant's visitation
of the two younger children stating .
4

"That he was unable to leave his work sufficiently to exercise his visitation rights; that
prohibition of visitation only during daylight
hours had effectively barred him from visitation and that the Plaintiff had refused to give
him her telephone number." (R. 48)
Plaintiff answered Defendant's Petition denymg a change of circumstances and alleged that Defendant was carrying 'Out a concerted plan to alienate the children from her. ( R. 53-58)
The matter came on for hearing on June 29
and 30, 1965, before the Honorable Thornley K.
Swan.
On July 27, 1965, the Court entered its Findings of Fact stating,
"That since entry of the said Decree on August 24, 1964, there has been a change of circumstances regarding the minor child, Gary
Maughan, in that said child absolutely refuses
to make the contemplated visit to the Plaintiff as required by the said Decree and threatened to 'run away' if forced to visit with the
Plaintiff in her home in California; that his
opposition to making said visits stems from
the intense dislike that he has acquired for
the Plaintiff's husband, Allyn Schroeder, further that he has made the Little League baseball team which will not end its activities until
August 1 and is very active in the Cub Scout
program and Defendant has been advised by
Gary's school counselor that because of Gary's
emotional antagonism towards the Plaintiff's
husband that a visit during the six-week period contemplated by the Decree would aggravate said emotional problem." (R. 60-60A)
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The Court further found
"That since the Decree entered on August
24 1964 there has been a change of circumst~nces i~egarding Defendant's visiting rights
with the minor children, Teri Lynn and J edcl
Alan, in that Defendant is unable to leave
his work sufficiently to exercise his visiting
rights and that prohibition of the Decree that
he be allowed to visit them only during the
daylight hours in Plaintiff's home, has effectively prohibited him from exercising his lawful rights of visitation and Plaintiff has refused to divulge her telephone number to the
Defendant which prevents him from even
visiting the children via telephone." (R. 60A)
A Modified Decree was entered on July 27,
1965, granting Defendant temporary custody of the
two younger children from August 6 to August 16
and granting Plaintiff temporary custody of Gary
from August 16 to August 30 and providing that
the Decree will be reviewed again by the Court in
May of 1966.
ARGUMENT

POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THERE
HAD BEEN A CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES DURING THE PERIOD AUGUST 4, 1964, TO JUNE 3, 1965,
SUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY A MODIFICATION OF THE
CHILD CUSTODY PORTION OF THE DECREE.

Plaintiff readily admits that Section 30-3-5,
U.C.A., 1953, authorizes the Court to make modifications and new orders with respect to divorce de·
crees. However, the law of this state has been firmly
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established that a substantial change of circiimstances must be shown to justify a modification of
a Decree or a new Order.
In the case of Gale v. Gale, 123 U. 277, 258
P.2d 986, This Court held after discussing a long
line of cases on the question of change of circumstances:
"A Divorce Decree may not be modified unless
it is alleged, proved and the Trial Court finds
that the circumstances upon which it was
based have undergone a substantial change."
(Emphasis added.)
The case of Carson v. Carson, 87 U. 1, 47 P.2d
894, held that a party to a divorce proceeding is not
entitled to a modification of a Decree . . .
"in absence of a showing that there has been
material and permanent change of conditions
since entry of the Decree." (Emphasis added.)
In the very recent case of Jorgensen v. Jorgensen, 17 U. 2d ______ , 406 P.2d 304, this Court again
recites the need for a ~'substantial change".
And in Keezer on Marriage and Divorce, 3rd
Edition at pp. 766 is found the following:
"The Petition for change 6f custody must be
supported by strong evidence showing that the
welfare of the child should be benefited by
the change. The burden of proof on this issue
is on the Petitioner."
A request for modification, such as Defendant's, which was presented to the Court within such
a short period of time after the prior hearing should
7

be viewed with great scrutiny. Indeed, it would appear that the relief which Defendant requested in
his Petition for Modification would have more properly been presented in a timely Appeal. As this
Court held in Cody v. Cody, 47 U. 456, 154 P. 952
at pp. 465:
"Where a party is dissatisfied with the original allowance or distribution of property or the
disposal of children, he must prosecute a timely Appeal to review the Court's Orders or
Decree in that regard."
Since a child custody case is equitable in nature,
the Court may review both the law and the facts.
Smith v. Smith, 1 U.2d 75, 262 P.2d 283.
A review of the Finding and the evidence in
support of them fails to disclose a substantial change
of circumstances. Paragraph seven of the Findings
sets forth the changes relied upon by the Court with
respect to Gary. They are as follows:
1. Gary absolutely refuses to make the visit
to California and threatens to run away because of
his dislike for Plaintiff's husband;
2. Gary is playing Little League ball which
lasts until August 1.
3. Gary is very active in Cub Scouts.
4. Gary's school counselor has advised Defendant that Gary's emotional antagonism toward
Plaintiff's husband will be aggravated if Gary visits
his mother for six weeks.
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With respect to item one, the Record is completely barren of any evidence other than Defend~nt's hearsay statements that Gary said he would
not make the visit and that he would run away.
But even if those statements were made they certainly should not be used as the basis for annuling
the prior Judgment of the Court and substituting
the demand of an eleven year old. It is urged by
Plaintiff that if Defendant is unable to control or
guide the actions of an eleven year old, after having
complete custody for two years, with greater skill
than he has displayed it might be best to relieve
him of the responsibility of control altogether.
With respect to the second item, Defendant
testified on cross examination that Gary was not
enrolled in Little League during the summer of 1964
because he was visiting with his grandparents during the enrollment period.
(Tr. 18) Certainly
a Court decreed visit with his natural mother toward the end of the Little League season should be
as important to the father of the child as an elective visit with grandparents which prevented the
boy from participating in Little League at all the
year prior.
With respect to the third item, the Record indicates that Gary was enrolled in Cub Scouts at the
time of the first modification hearing ( R. 19), and
there is nothing in the Record to indicate any change
in this activity during the months prior to the
second modification hearing. It should also be noted
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that Plaintiff had made arrangements in California
to have Gary carry on with his Cub Scout activities
while he was there. (Tr. 48)
With respect to the fourth item, the Record
indicates that all Gary's school teacher testified to,
(which was over Plaintiff's objection, Tr. 32-33)
was the fact that a visit to California "might have
an emotional effect". (Tr. 33) Under cross examination when asked if it was his opinion that it
would be bad for Gary to visit with his mother for
six weeks he stated he didn't know and went on
to say
something that would be entirely up to
Gary on the thing. I don't know enough about
his feelings toward his mother to know." (Tr.
~'It's

37)

Nowhere in the Record does the school teacher testify that Gary has an emotional antagonism toward
Plaintiff's husband as the Finding states.
It is submitted that the Record fails to support
the Findings and further that the Findings do not
set forth substantial changes of circumstances sufficient to justify annuling the six weeks summer
custody period with the mother. of the child.
Examining the second portio.n of the Findings
and the evidence in support thereof, paragraph
eight thereof sets forth the following changes of circumstances with respect to Defendant's visitation
rights with the two younger children.
10

Defendant is unable to leave his work sufficiently to exercise his visiting rights.
1.

2. The prohibition of the Decree that Defendant be allowed to visit the children only during daylight hours in Plaintiff's home has effectively prohibited him from exercising his lawful rights of
visitation and Plaintiff has refused to give Defendant her telephone number.
With respect to the first item, Defendant was
Eiaking $300.00 per year more at the time of the
second hearing than the first (Tr. 14); his work
schedules had not changed from the time of the
first hearing to the second one (Tr. 16); he has 20
working days' vacation each year ('Tr. 13) ; when
he works the Sunday shift from midnight until 8 :00
a.m. Monday he does not have to report to work
until Thursday at 4 :00 p.m. (Tr. 17) It is also
significant to note that in the year's period prior
to the first modification hearing the Defendant
only visited the children once in California. (Tr.
16-17)
·with respect to the second item of the Findings, it should be noted that it is patently defective
in that the Decree does not limit Defendant to visitation within Plaintiff's home and in any event,
there are absolutely no facts suggested in the Record
to indicate that there has been a change of circumstances with respect to this item.
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POINT II
THE MODIFlCATION WAS NOT IN THE BEST
INTEREST OF THE CHILDREN OF THE PARTIES.

Certainly, the policy of the law with respect
to child custody matters has been stated by the Court
on numerous occasions. Most recently, in the case
of Motzk~ v. Motzkus, 17 U.2d ______ , 406 P.2d 31,
this Court stated as fallows:
"But it should be kept in mind that a contest
over the custody of a child is something more
than an adversarial proceeding between the
parties. More important than their rights is
the welfare of the child which is always the
paramount consideration, and which the
Court, representing the interest of the public, has a duty to safeguard."
In this respect it is significant to note that nowhere does Defendant's Petition allege, nor did the
Court find that it would be in the best interest of
the children of the parties if the ear lier Modification of the Decree be set aside and the later Modification be substituted.

The Record is replete with evidence which in·
dicates a bitter and vindictive father whose main
concern appears to be to defeat the order of the
Court and to alienate the children from their mother.
Where else would this lad of tender years (age ten
at the time of the first modification hearing) acquire the feeling he expressed in chambers to the
Judge at the first modification hearing. Quoting
from that transcript commencing at pp. 71:
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--Now where do you think you would like
to live?
"A. Bountiful.
"'Q. You think you would like to live in
Bountiful?
"A. Yes.
"Q. Who with?
"A. With my dad and mom.
''Q. Is that your real mom or your step
mom?
"A. Cleo. Not my real mom. I don't want
to live with her up in California because you
know, she did something real bad, you know,
bad. I want to live with my dad.
"Q. Why?
"A. Well, because what Pat - what she did
with Allyn was bad.
"Q. Who do you call 'Pat?'
"A. Mom. My regular mom.
"Q. You call her 'Pat?' Is that her nickname?
"A. Yes. It's 'Pat'. And when she went out
on dates with Allyn, Dad, he tried to make her
stop this but she wouldn't stop."
There is nothing in the Record to suggest the
truthfulness of any of these statements which were
in the mind of this ten year old boy. He was seven
years of age when the Divorce Complaint was filed.
"Q.

(R. 10)

Plaintiff in her testimony indicated the problems which she had with the two younger children
13

after they had visited with the Defendant in California. Quoting from the Transcript at page 50.
"Q. Now with respect to your observations
that the children have been distressed, will you
tell us what you have seen as the children
have come back from various contacts or visits
with Mr. Jeppson? Will you state also where
you have observed these things?
"A. When Mr. Jeppson visited the children
in September (1964) Teri Lynn and Jedd
were both very disappointed when they heard
from Gary that he wasn't coming to California this summer. And they stated that Saylor had heard Gary state this fact, and had
reiterated by saying, 'Yes, Teri Lynn and Jedd
if you want to see Gary you have to come to
Utah.'
"And further when I was speaking with Teri
later, she was very concerned about the fact
that the family was split. She said to me,
'You know, Mother, Gary's awfully far away
from us, 700 miles." "
It would seem apparent that Defendant had no intention of complying with the Decree less than a
month after it was entered and was at that time
deviously working on the minds· of the two younger
children.

Defendant's performance also left much to be
desired with respect to his preparation of Gary to
take the trip to California as illustrated by his remarks on direct examination wherein he testified
as to his conversation with Gary the day after the
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DH:ree was filed. Quoting from page 5 of the Tran-

script:

"Q. Now since the hearing in the matter,
this matter, the former hearing in July of
1964 has Gary expressed or demonstrated to
you ~ny antagonism or objection to spending
six weeks with his mother and step father
in California?
". . . Q. Confine this to the time since the
Decree and since the hearing of last year which I think was on July 28th, wasn't it, Mr.
Hansen?
" ... A. I believe it's the day after that, the
Decree was filed.
"Q. Tell the Court what happened, and how
it came about.
"A. vVell , we instructed Gary that he would
be required to go to California the next summer beginning the first of July, for six weeks.
And he began crying. He said he didn't want
to go.
"We told hini that he must go; not to argue
aboid it.
"He said - then he said, not to myself but
to my wife, that if he had to go, that he'd
ask to stop at a service station or a rest room,
as soon as he could, then run away.
On cross examination Defendant was asked what
he did to prepare Gary to make the visit to California. Quoting from page 19 of the Transcript:
"Q. Now, what did you do to attempt to prepare Gary to take this six-months' visitation
in California?
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"A. I told him he had to go.
"Q. Was that all you said?
"A. Well, I told him that if - I told him
that I would speak to my attorney again, and
he should plan on going.
"Q. That you'd speak to your attorney to see
if he had to go?
"A. No.
"Q. Oh.
"A. I just told him that I would - he asked
me if there wasn't anything I could do to keep
him from having to spend all this summer
down there, and have to go back and live with
somebody that he didn't want to be around.
And I told him I would do all that I could,
if he really felt that way.
"Q. And that's what you have done, is do
all you could to see that he didn't have to go?
"A. I don't know about that.
It is submitted that Defendant's entire course
of conduct with respect to Gary's visitation and with
respect to a parent's responsibility to help engender
love and respect for each other. left much to be desired. It would further seem that Defendant. was
not attempting to promote good will between the
children and their mother nor was he concerned
with the best interest of the children. It would
seem that if the responses from the Defendant and
the children are indicative of what Defendant's best
efforts to comply with the Decree of the Court were
16

then it becomes obvious why a child might build
up a resistance. It would further seem obvious that
the court at the first modification hearing acted with
great wisdom in requiring the Defendant to visit
the two younger children only in the State of California and during daylight hours. The wisdom of
the six weeks visitation period during the summer
is further apparent in that it would provide the
mother an opportunity to build natural ties between
herself and child which may have been damaged as
the result of the devious practices which the boy
had been exposed to.
The conduct of Defendant during the entire
time tends to raise a question of his good faith and
sincerity as to the best interests of the children.
Plaintiff is prompted to quote from the earlier Utah
case of Chaffee v. Chaffee, 63 U. 261, 225 P. 76 at
page 271, wherein the Court says:
"To say the least, there appears to be a thread
of disingenuousness on the part of Defendant
running through the entire proceeding. The
application for modification of the property
features of the Decree, without any substantial grounds therefor, interposed so soon after
the Decree was entered, tends to engender a
doubt as to the real purpose of Defendant in
authorizing the Court to determine the property rights of the parties as was done in the
Decree. If his purpose was to get rid of his
wife and child by final Decree, with the mental reservation that as soon as this was acc.omplish~d he would apply for an Order reheVIng him of that part of the Decree which
17

was burdensome to him, he could not hav~
expressed it much more clearly than he has
clone by his conduct since the Decree became
final."
Comparing the instant case to the language in
the Chaffee case, Defendant obtained the custody
of the eldest child, Gary, for a school year through
agreement; and when Plaintiff attempted to have
the child i·eturned, Defendant filed his Petition for
Modification of the Decree to obtain custody of the
child alleging that Gary had become emotionally
stabilized and was happy with Defendant and did
not want to return to Plaintiff. The Decree was
modified granting Defendant his desire. Yet, when
it came time some 91/2 months later to perform and
send Gary to California for the six weeks period
with his mother, he filed another Petition for Modification, this time alleging that the boy had developed an "emotional antagonism", notwithstanding the fact that he had been in the exclusive care
of the Defendant.
It is submitted that if Defendant had in mind

Dbtaining custody of Gary with the mental reservation that by the time the summer visitation period
came around he would have another plan to keep
the boy from going and in fact a plan to bring the
two younger children to him in Utah, he couldn't
have expressed it more clearly than he has by his
conduct.
18

---

CONCLUSION
In conclusion, Plaintiff urges that the eYidence
cloes not support the Findings and that there had
not been a substantial change of circumstances at
the time the lower Court granted the modification.
Plaintiff further urges that there is ample
evidence that the Modification was not in the best
interest of the children.
The portions of the Decree entered July 27,
1965, that pertain to custody and visitation should
0t: set aside and the Decree of August 21, 1964, reinstated.
Respectfully submitted,
W. Eugene Hansen
NIELSEN, CONDER AND
HANSEN
510 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for
Plaintiff and Appellant
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